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INTRODUCTION 
Among the highlights of the melodramatic 20th anniversary Summit 
of the Organization of African Unity was the Valedictory Report of the 
Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo.1 Within the context of a pro forma ac-
count of his stewardship Edem Kodjo offered reformatory and policy 
prescriptions intended to improve the organization's structural and in-
stitutional ability to attain its multi-dimensional objectives. One impor-
tant objective which Edem Kodjo addressed is the perennial concern of 
the OAU with the total liberation of the African continent from colonial 
and white minority rule.2 The Secretary-General perceived this area of 
the organization's concerns as one in which the OAU can boast of the 
most achievement as well as one in which it is going to meet its stiffest 
test in the future. 
The OAU's success in the area of decolonization derived from its 
persistent support for liberation movements and wars in Portuguese 
Africa and Zimbabwe which eventually paid off in the attainment of in-
dependence and black rule by these territories. Its future test, as seen by 
the Secretary-General, resides in the strength, resolve and stubbornness 
of the white minority population in South Africa and Namibia. The ob-
vious determination of the South African government to give in-
dependence to Namibia on South African terms, rather than on terms ac-
ceptable to the United Nations and the OAU, has created an impasse 
which does not appear to be resolvable in the near future. Meanwhile, in 
South Africa itself no meaningful measure has yet been contemplated 
which would enable the black majority to participate on equal terms in 
the political and socio-economic life of the country. Indeed, rather than 
pursue meaningful reforms, the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist 
Government seems intent on allowing only cosmetic changes which are 
unacceptable to African opinion, simultaneously building a formidable 
capacity to defend the status quo in Namibia and South Africa if the 
need arises. 
South Africa's inclination toward maintaining the existing structure 
of racial relations and her resolve to defend it through the acquisition of 
a deterrent military capability — conventional and nuclear — constitute, 
for Edem Kodjo, the future challenge which the OAU must meet if it is 
to attain the important goal of eliminating colonial and white minority 
rule from the African continent. Edem Kodjo believes that the OAU has 
the capacity to attain this objective but that it needs to activate, sustain 
and enhance this capacity through total commitment and sacrifice, par-
ticularly in respect of military support for the liberation forces active in 
Namibia and South Africa. It is not that Edem Kodjo is a committed 
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skeptic who believes that negotiations are futile, rather he is a realist who 
while encouraging maximum effort in negotiations wants the OAU to 
match the build-up of military capacity and the increasing militarism in 
South Africa, if only for the purpose of attaining a balance of power in 
any negotiating encounter. 
Thus in his valedictory report, Edem Kodjo advocates a "balance of 
terror" approach to the relations between the OAU and South Africa. 
The essence of this approach is that the OAU must encourage any 
African country which has the capacity to engage in a nuclear energy 
program to do so, as a matter of urgency and duty,3 in order to develop a 
nuclear weapon capacity to counter-balance the nuclear capacity which 
South Africa is believed to have attained in recent years. For such an 
African country there will be no need to hide under the camouflage of a 
peaceful nuclear energy program; the development of an "African 
Liberation Bomb," akin to the "Islamic Bomb" so beloved of Pakistan, 
Iraq and Libya, would be a messianic duty which must be publicized to 
bolster the morale of the oppressed Africans and Liberation movements. 
Further, it would serve to remind the white minority of the inevitability 
of change and the futility of resistance. 
This call to nuclear arms was the first time any Secretary-General 
had attempted to focus the attention of African leaders at any OAU sum-
mit on the desirability of a counter-balancing African nuclear power in 
relation to South Africa. Although South Africa's nuclear energy pro-
gram had been the subject of attack by individual African leaders (par-
ticularly after the reported detonation of a nuclear device in September 
19794), the OAU had at no time in its deliberations, either at the Council 
of Ministers or at the Council of Heads of States and Governments, con-
sidered South Africa's nuclear energy program as an additional problem 
in the fight for decolonization and black majority rule. Rather, the OAU 
continued to adopt resolutions on South Africa in a way which did not 
acknowledge the possible use of nuclear weapons in the decolonization 
process. At the 20th Summit, for example, the OAU repeated its 
customary condemnation of the apartheid system in South Africa and 
South Africa's occupation of Namibia and called for greater support for 
and escalation of the armed struggle in Namibia and South Africa.5 For 
the past twenty years the OAU has perceived the armed struggle for the 
liberation of white-ruled South Africa in terms of a massive and sustain-
ed non-conventional military (guerrilla) onslaught on South Africa. 
Edem Kodjo may have had several reasons for his "balance of ter-
ror" statement. He may have been seeking to modify the standard 
African perception or he may simply have been attempting to rouse the 
OAU from its current lethargy by reminding it of the immensity of the 
threat to Africa. Alternatively, he may just have been out to give en-
couragement to, or seek corporate support for, the few countries which 
have mooted the idea of embarking on a nuclear energy research pro-
gram.6 It is, indeed, because of the existence of such nuclear aspirants 
within the OAU that the idea of "an African liberation bomb' ' is not just 
an ephemeral and terminal idea whose significances will attenuate with 
the receding influence of Edem Kodjo. Instead, it is a potential element 
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in the politics of the OAU and decolonization in Africa. Although South 
Africa is believed to have a nuclear capability, there is no indication as to 
how this capacity may be neutralized to attain a military solution to the 
problem of white intransigence in South Africa. The suggestion seems to 
be that the development of an African bomb and the capacity to deliver it 
will be enough to change radically the strategic balance in Africa vu à vis 
South Africa and compel South Africa to seek accommodation with 
Africa rather than risk nuclear annihilation. 
This optimistic view of the nuclear bomb raises, for the African con-
tinent, what might be termed a "nuclear paradox," that is, the con-
traposition between the functions allocated to the nuclear bomb. The 
Africans perceive the South African bomb as negative input into the 
politics of apartheid, the impact of which will freeze the status quo in 
South Africa while attributing to the African bomb the role of a 
liberator. The nuclear bomb promises both to preserve an unwanted 
system and to create a new one. The paradox dissolves, however, once it 
is assumed that the South Africans will not use their nuclear capacity in 
their own defence, yet, because this is an assumption which cannot 
realistically enter into any calculation of the role of nuclear bombs in the 
politics of decolonization, the paradox persists. 
Once the readiness of the South Africans to use their nuclear 
capability enters the power equation on the African continent, any 
African bomb which may be developed ceases to be an instrument of 
liberation. An African bomb in this context cannot be a rational instru-
ment of policy considering that its purpose is to liberate and not to 
destroy; it will be an unusable military instrument. To restore any ra-
tionality to the bomb one would have to presume its diplomatic utility. 
This is to say that the development of an African bomb will redress the 
imbalance in military capabilities in relation to South Africa and increase 
the pressure on South Africa to embark on meaningful socio-political 
reforms aimed at extending the rights and privileges, now exclusively en-
joyed by the white population, to the black majority. This pressure will 
derive from the South Africans perceptions of the dangers inherent in the 
possibility of African nuclear power. Such a power may not always 
behave rationally and may either offer the bomb to a liberation move-
ment, such as the ANC, or use the bomb directly irrespective of the 
dangers of retaliation, or other consequences, toward the object of its 
liberation efforts. If the South Africans fail to perceive this danger or fail 
to possess the means of neutralizing the possibility of an irrational use of 
the bomb by an African nuclear power, then the diplomatic utility of the 
bomb would evaporate. 
South Africa's current resistance to Namibia's independence and 
universal democracy in South Africa is based essentially on the percep-
tion of an ability to neutralize any military threat emanating from 
Africa. It is this confidence which the advocates of an African nuclear 
weapon seek to undermine in order to speed up the Namibian in-
dependence process and bring about acceptable socio-political reforms in 
South Africa. 
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THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR CHOICE 
The prescription of a nuclear option for Africa must be understood 
against the background of the failure of diplomacy to bring about any 
desirable change in Namibia and South Africa. 
In Namibia the hopes of independence, which reached an apex with 
the promise of UN supervised elections in 1978, have disappeared with 
South Africa's intransigence and prevarication. South Africa frustrated 
the Geneva Conference of January 1981, which had been summoned to 
discuss the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution No. 435, 
by refusing to sign the ceasefire document. Resolution 435 called for 
a ceasefire, the restriction of South African and Nami-
bian forces to a specified number of bases, the emplace-
ment of a United Nations Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) to monitor the ceasefire, the repeal of 
all discriminatory laws and the release of all political 
prisoners precedent to the holding of free and fair elec-
tions for a Constituent Assembly, the entry into force of 
a new constitution drawn up by the assembly and the 
consequent achievement of independence of Namibia.7 
South Africa's excuse for not acceding to the ceasefire proposals 
was its dissatisfaction with the UN's recognition of SWAPO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Namibian people. The UN, in South 
Africa's view, was not an impartial agent and, given the dominance of 
radical and Third World countries hostile to South Africa in the UN, she 
could not trust UNTAG to act in an impartial way. The South Africans 
were also unhappy with the UN electoral proposals which upheld the 
democratic ideal of one man, one vote. Instead the Botha regime prefer-
red a two-tier voting system under which each voter would cast two 
ballots: one on the basis of proportional representation for national can-
didates and the other a 'winner-take-all' for local candidates. 
By June 1982, it appeared that the Western Contact Group had suc-
ceeded in restoring the momentum of negotiation. However, in spite of 
South Africa's public affirmation of sympathy for a new set of proposals 
worked out by the Contact Group and accepted by SWAPO and the 
Frontline States, South Africa failed to participate in the New York four-
party talks which were intended to iron out differences on substantial 
issues. Worse still, South Africa escalated her aggression on SWAPO 
bases in Angola and called for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola before any serious negotiations on the future of Namibia could 
begin. 
The introduction of a linkage between the presence of Cuban troops 
in Angola and the future of Angola seems to have wiped from the 
African mind any faith in South Africa's intentions for Namibia. As a 
result, there was reaffirmation of commitment to the liberation struggle 
by SWAPO and of support for this struggle by the Frontline States, 
Nigeria and the OAU immediately after the abortive Geneva Conference: 
We are left with no alternative but to support the escala-
tion and intensification of the armed struggle heroically 
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being waged by SWAPO. In this regard the OAU 
member states as a whole pledge their full backing. 
Africa pledges increased material and financial 
assistance to SWAPO until final victory and total 
liberation of Namibia.8 
The deep frustration inherent in this fatalistic acceptance of violence 
as the only workable instrument of change in Namibia conforms to the 
enthusiastic solution of the former Secretary-General of the OAU, a 
nuclear option in the politics of decolonization. The logic of this solution 
is even more compelling if it is remembered that in South Africa itself the 
future for the black man, as conceived by the dominant power elites, is 
less promising than what awaits the Namibians. 
The wind of change which Prime Minister Vorster promised in the 
aftermath of Angolan independence failed to materialize. In fact, as the 
limited reforms embarked upon by the Botha administration have since 
shown, the change was not intended to touch the African population. 
Botha's attempt to create an acceptable face for apartheid has been em-
bodied in the constitutional reforms, the intent of which is to create a 
three-chamber parliament for three of the recognized races in South 
Africa — Whites, Coloureds and Indians. This reform was designed to 
give Coloureds and Indians greater decision-making powers in matters 
exclusive to their own communities. It envisages a Coloured Community 
Assembly of ninety-two members (eighty-two elected, six appointed on a 
proportional basis and four appointed directly) and an Asian Assembly 
of forty-six members (forty-one elected, three appointed on a propor-
tional basis and two appointed directly).9 
The more important aspect of the constitutional reform from the 
point of view of apartheid are the provisions for power sharing at the 
centre. At this level of government, the reform envisages "a Council of 
Ministers with a membership of six Ministers, three Coloured Ministers 
and two Asian Ministers in addition to the three Premiers who are 
members ex-officio. The State President will serve as the chairman of the 
Council of Cabinets."10 
The Afrikaner expects this limited recognition of the political rights 
of Coloureds and Indians to reverse the age-long alienation of these two 
racial groups from South African society and to increase their stake in, 
and support for, it without compromising the Afrikaner commitment to 
separate development. But although this concession may seem only 
cosmetic to those who wish to see universal sufferage in South Africa, in 
the opinion of a great many Afrikaners it is too revolutionary. Constitu-
tional reform is considered to be the chief reason for the drop in support 
for the Nationalist Party and the strong showing of the ultra-right 
Reconstituted Nationalist Party (HNP) of Jaap Marais in the 1981 
General Elections.11 
A major manifestation of the restiveness in Afrikanerdom about 
this limited and obviously inadequate concession to racial equality is the 
recent rift within the Broederbond, an influential secret society. Dr. 
Carel Boshoff, who was chairman of the Broederbond, resigned in July 
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1983 following controversy over his support of a report by the South 
African Bureau of Racial Affairs attacking the new constitution as a 
force which would heighten rather than regulate conflict between races. 
Dr. Boshoff himself is said to have attacked the new constitution "for 
deviating from the doctrine of separate development by not making ade-
quate provision for the 'self-determination' of South Africa's different 
races."12 Dr. BoshofPs call for the withdrawal of the new constitution 
for redrafting is alleged to have the backing of at least 40% of the 
Broeders.13 Although the new Chairman of the Bond, Professor Lange, 
is inclined towards the constitutional reforms, there are two factors 
which stay that inclination. First, the level of dissent concerning the 
reforms and, second, the not insignificant fact of Dr. Boshoff's im-
mediate election to the executive of the powerful Federation of 
Afrikaans Cultural Societies,14 with which hundreds of Afrikaner 
cultural societies are affiliated, suggesting a deep and widespread ap-
prehension about the reforms and opposition to them. 
Although the opposition lost out in the referendum it may still be 
able to undermine the intent if not the form of the constitutional 
reforms. Based on previous experience, it would be reasonable to 
presume that the Botha regime will attempt compromises which are more 
likely to satisfy Afrikaner parochialism than the demands for adaptation 
in a less hospitable and less understanding world. In that event, new 
structures may be created in race relations but they are unlikely to have 
any significant consequences for the patterns of those relations. The new 
constitution was not devised in order to create a racially integrated 
political system. However, the suggestion that it has the potential to do 
so is likely to stimulate counterbalancing measures to negate this poten-
tial. This can be expected if the National Party hopes to arrest the latent 
danger posed by conservatives and ultra-right elements to its dominance 
in the politics of White South Africa. 
The Botha regime, however, appears committed to this new con-
stitutional formula which promises to extend meaningful citizenship and 
power-sharing to 2.5 million Coloured and 800,000 Indians. And, 
although the Coloured and Indian population is generally skeptical 
about their potential political gains, this reform remains the most radical 
movement away from apartheid in South Africa's history and the one 
which has the most chance to bring about the political and racial integra-
tion much feared by right-wing Afrikaner opinion. Yet, even if this 
potential is realized, the new constitutional formula would not have 
begun to resolve the problem for which South Africa is almost universal-
ly condemned, for the critical problem needing resolution is not that of 
the status and privileges of the Coloured and Indian populations. 
Although the rights of Coloureds and Indians in a multi-racial society are 
a constituent and enduring element of the fight for justice and racial 
equality in South Africa, the focus of this fight has been and remains the 
status of the black majority in South Africa. 
For the 21 million black Africans, the Afrikaner commitment to the 
philosophy of a separate development remains the determinant of their 
rights and privileges in South Africa. For this vast and long-suffering 
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majority the new constitutional proposals offer no hope of future ac-
commodation in the South African policy. It is, instead, decidedly silent 
on the place of black Africans in the new "liberalized" order in South 
Africa. Indeed, the constitutional reforms, as promoted by the Botha 
regime, indicate a resolute commitment to apartheid and a total lack of 
desire to face the logic of the demographic situation in South Africa and 
the ethos of group relations in the twentieth century. It is a testimony to 
the depth of this commitment in the Afrikaner psyche that these inade-
quate proposals have been met with virulent opposition on the grounds 
that they promise to undermine the age-old favorable isolation of the 
white population. 
This commitment is also evident in the resolute pursuit of the Ban-
tustan policy for the 21 million Africans in spite of its overwhelming re-
jection by the affected Africans and the international community. This 
persistence is understandable, however, if the 'magic' of the Bantustan 
policy, at least from the point of view of the Afrikaner, is recognized. By 
creating independent ethnic homelands for the African population, the 
Afrikaner hopes to soothe world opinion as, in these homelands, 
Africans are seemingly granted the opportunity to exercise full citizen-
ship rights which are denied them in South Africa. The inferior, disen-
franchised African becomes a full-fledged citizen of a newly created 
sovereign state administered by fellow Africans. Since these new states 
are sovereign in principle, South Africa cannot be held responsible for 
the subsequent activities of their governments, particularly in respect to 
the rights of their citizens and their material well-being. 
The Afrikaner elites are not, however, merely concerned with a 
method of absolving themselves from any responsibility for the welfare 
of an unwanted population. Rather the seemingly benevolent policy of 
enfranchising the African and enhancing his dignity by the awarding of 
citizenship has selfish intent. By creating the independent homelands, the 
Afrikaner seeks to impose a demographic solution on a problem which is 
fundamentally one of political and distributive justice. The allocation of 
new citizenships to the African population automatically deprives the 
Africans of South African citizenship while encouraging the evolution of 
a new South Africa in which white citizens will enjoy numerical 
superiority. 
That the solution preferred by the Afrikaner for the multi-racial 
problem is inappropriate is illustrated by its rejection by the African 
population, all the significant groups and institutions with general and 
specific interests in South African affairs (the OAU, the Liberation 
Movements, the UNO) and by the overwhelming majority of world opi-
nion. This rejection derives from the mutually exclusive perceptions of 
the key problem in South Africa — the problem of redefining the status 
of the black African majority in South Africa's socio-economic order. 
As far as most of the world is concerned the Bantustan policy aims at 
avoiding the problem rather than providing meaningful, long-lasting and 
universally acceptable solutions. 
The universal rejection of the Bantustan policy derives from the 
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nature of the Bantustans and its implications for the future of the black 
African. In the first place, the Bantustans are organized in a haphazard 
geographical manner without any consideration for contiguity. An even 
more serious element of their geography is that they are located in the 
most unproductive land areas of South Africa constituting roughly 17% 
of the total land area. The black African population which constitutes 
nearly 75% of the South African population is thus expected to live on 
and utilize only 17% of the land area leaving the greater proportion of 
the remaining 83% in the hands of the white population which con-
stitutes only 20% of the total South African population. 
Thus for the African, the Bantustans, with their poor, overcrowded 
and overgrazed land offer very little hope of escape from a life of squalor 
and permanent impoverishment. This prognosis of life in the Bantustans 
was not unknown to the Afrikaner political elites. The report of the 
Quail Commission (1978) into independence for Ciskei, for example, was 
very explicit in its observations and conclusions.15 The Commission saw 
appalling living conditions, massive unemployment (39%), low 
agricultural productivity, chronic shortage of housing, overgrazed land, 
a total lack of industries, a predominantly female population and living 
standards which were the worst in South Africa.16 Besides, the Quail 
Commission saw in the Ciskeians a total lack of enthusiasm for the idea 
of independence and, therefore, recommended that they would be better 
off with universal suffrage in a unitary state. But, despite the clear 
evidence of its unfeasibility, Ciskei was granted its independence in 1981 
joining Transkei (1976), Bophuthasnana (1977) and Vendu (1979) in the 
Afrikaner march towards a total solution to the African problem. 
The Bantustans have proved to be independent only in concept and 
not in reality. All of them rely heavily on the income from their migrant 
labor force and more significantly on South Africa's subsidy. In 1980 
Transkei received nearly one hundred and thirteen million rands (R113) 
as a subsidy from South Africa, constituting more than 70% of its total 
revenue17 while for Vendu the South African subsidy represented 90% of 
its expected revenue for the same year. Attempts to moderate this 
dependence through structural adjustments in the economy have so far 
failed owing to the unwillingness of South African investors to take ad-
vantage of the favorable labor conditions and concessions to encourage 
industry to move into Bantustans or even in to the border areas. Thus, 
from all indications the Bantustans are destined, in the immediate future, 
to remain heavily dependent on South Africa for their economic survival 
and, therefore, remain essentially quasi-colonies of South Africa. 
Given their current predicament and future prospects the Ban-
tustans do not offer the Africans a realistic incentive for abandoning 
their South African citizenship for any other. Even more critical, from 
the point of view of acceptance, is the fact that the Bantustan policy does 
not represent the desires of a majority of Africans who are supposed to 
benefit from this benevolent allocation of new citizenships. From all in-
dications the Africans prefer to remain South African citizens with full 
political, economic and social rights. This point has been repeatedly and 
forceful articulated by all the significant associations and persons 
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representing African interests as well as by such concerned bodies as the 
OAU and UNO. 
As long as the Afrikaners persist with their preferred solution they 
can expect it to be resisted in the most violent way possible. The 
Afrikaners are fully aware of this and the increased activities of the 
liberation movements in the region have served as a constant reminder of 
the unacceptability of the Bantustan solution. Notwithstanding the ob-
vious signals, the Afrikaners have shown no intention of abandoning this 
solution and seem to be prepared to face any violent attempts to bring 
about a different kind of order from the one of their design. In this con-
text, military weapons play a prominent part. Given the logic of military 
power and of South Africa's isolation from the rest of the world, it is not 
surprising that she should seek, and has consistently sought, for herself 
the most sophisticated and most destructive weapons in the world today, 
if only to deter her enemies. It is also not surprising that, faced with 
South Africa's intransigence, the Africans, apart from accepting the in-
evitability of a protracted war of liberation, have begun to think and talk 
of the need to acquire an African nuclear bomb which will not only 
neutralize South Africa's nuclear advantage but will undermine the 
military superiority upon which the stubbornness and equanimity of the 
Afrikaner political elites are founded. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOMB 
The nuclear weapons debate in the OAU and in a few African states 
such as Nigeria, is for the most part, inbred with the belief that South 
Africa has the capacity to develop an atomic bomb if it has not already 
done so. There is no serious disagreement in Africa, about South 
Africa's nuclear status; both the proponents and opponents of a nuclear 
option for black Africa are agreed that South Africa either already 
possesses some nuclear warheads or has the capacity and, more impor-
tantly, the will to develop and use nuclear weapons. The South Africans 
themselves have consistently denied the possession of nuclear warheads 
or of plans to develop them while not denying their ability to create them 
should the need arise.18 The scenario of South Africa as a nuclear power 
began to acquire the seriousness that it now poses for the African with 
South Africa's discovery of a new uranium enrichment process19 and, by 
implication, the acquisition of an enhanced capacity to develop nuclear 
weapons. 
This discovery put within South Africa's grasp the potential to 
develop nuclear weapons. Given the absence of international supervision 
at the two major nuclear reactor sites at Pelindaba and Valindaba, and 
South Africa's commitment to military invincibility, it would not be 
unreasonable to be suspicious of South Africa's intentions in the area of 
nuclear policy. As far back as 1974, the Vice President of South Africa's 
Atomic Energy Board revealed the extent of South Africa's development 
in nuclear research when he suggested after the India atomic test of May 
1974, that South Africa was capable of making a bomb and "was in fact 
technologically more advanced than India in the field."20 
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Confirmation of this capability appeared in the form of a proposed 
atomic test by South Africa in the Kalahari Desert in the summer of 
1977. This test was, ostensibly, thwarted by the combined pressures of 
the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Western European 
powers. The South African Foreign Minister, at the time, Mr. Roelof 
Botha, denied the allegations that South Africa was planning to test a 
nuclear device although U.S. reconnaissance satellite photographs 
revealed construction in the Kalahari Desert which was identified to be 
typical of a test site.21 The same response was given to the U.S. in-
telligence report of October 1979 "that a low-yield nuclear explosion had 
occurred in an area including South Africa."22 Both the chairman of the 
South African Atomic Energy Board, Dr. Wynand de Villers and the 
Foreign Minister, denied any knowledge of the explosion while one of 
South Africa's nuclear experts23 suggested that a Soviet intercontinental 
missile, which failed to explode after landing twelve hundred miles south 
of the Cape in 1963, might have been responsible for the explosion. 
These denials may be genuine and may suggest that South Africa has 
not yet developed a nuclear warhead or, at least, not one that is testable, 
but they by no means invalidate the suggestion that South Africa could 
produce nuclear warheads if it chooses and was determined to do so. An 
alternate view is to see South Africa as using the nuclear threat — that is, 
the threat to go nuclear — to forge a favorable strategic relationship with 
the United States and NATO. The suggestion here is that the advertise-
ment of her nuclear capacity is a more effective policy option than the ac-
tual production and use of nuclear weapons.24 By publicizing its capacity 
to develop nuclear weapons which, in view of the uranium enrichment 
formula developed by South African scientists and the possession of a 
reprocessing plant capable of a separating plutonium from the reaction 
full waste, is highly credible. South Africa, it is argued, is seeking to 
scare the Western powers into a policy of accommodation or co-
operation since it would be in their interest to be in a position to restrain 
a nuclear-armed South Africa. This is the explanation which has 
sometimes been given for the alleged test preparations in the Kalahari 
Desert in 1977. This view is unacceptable for a number of reasons. 
In the first place, the scenario is based on the assumption that South 
Africa does not yet possess nuclear warheads. There is no evidence as to 
South Africa's nuclear weapons status. The fact that South Africa has 
not yet tested a nuclear device is not proof that it has not developed 
one.25 Secondly, it is unlikely that the logic of South Africa's nuclear 
research will be deliberately short-circuited by faith in the beneficial con-
sequences of the announcement effect of nuclear capability. While a 
nuclear-armed South Africa may attract greater military interaction with 
the Western powers,26 this may not preclude the attempt by the Western 
powers, to abolish the apartheid system and to create of a just society in 
South Africa. In any case, the relentless pressures of liberation 
movements, the OAU and others is likely to ensure that the Western 
powers do not abandon this end. 
A third and perhaps more compelling reason for believing that 
South Africa will not be content to limit her nuclear capability to 
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peaceful uses alone resides in the ideology and psychology of the 
Afrikaner power elites. As Professor Spence has warned, any assessment 
of nuclear possibilities in South Africa must take account of 
the distorting influence of the Afrikaner's ideological 
perception, the growing sense of isolation on the part of 
its leadership, the deep-rooted fear of an aggressive, 
revolutionary Soviet Union and the absence of a 
sizeable professional elite skilled in the theory and prac-
tice of nuclear strategy and contributing to informed 
debate on these matters.27 
The resolute transformation of South Africa into a garrison-state 
through external procurement and domestic development of military 
weapons and the persistent attachment to the philosophy of a separate 
development, as evidenced in the turmoil over the constitutional reforms 
and commitment to the Bantustan policy, are symptoms of the disturb-
ing influences which compel a pessimistic assessment of South Africa's 
nuclear intentions. 
There is nothing in current Afrikaner attitudes or recent South 
African politics which undermine South Africa's status as a 'Pariah 
State,' one which, in Richard Brett's taxonomy of potential nuclear 
powers, combines "the disadvantages of pygmies and paranoids along 
with more visceral and unremitting opposition by their regional enemies 
and growing isolation from most of the rest of the world."28 It can, of 
course, be argued that South Africa's superiority in conventional 
weaponry and abilities is adequate for coping with the pressures on a 
pariah state. However, this conventional superiority can only discourage 
the acquisition of nuclear arms if the permanence of conventional 
superiority can be guaranteed. But as long as the opposition of the 
Africans and the commitment to change in South Africa retains its vitali-
ty, there can be no guarantee that the strategic balance will not be 
disturbed in a way which would compel South Africa to resort to the 
development of nuclear arms. 
AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PREFERENCE 
African reaction to the prospects of a nuclear-armed South Africa 
has been generally limited to the rhetoric of condemnation and resolu-
tions, at OAU meetings, to that effect. African concern about South 
Africa's nuclear program came to the fore with the announcement in 
1976 of France's29 agreement to sell twin 1000MW pressurized water 
reactors, together with supplies of low enrichment fuel, to the South 
African Electricity Supply Commission. At the 13th OAU Summit30 the 
host Prime Minister, Sir Seewosague Ramgoolam, in his opening speech, 
initiated the evolution of an African opinion when he warned about the 
dangers inherent in the French reactor sales and the subsequent 
nuclearization of South Africa. The OAU shared Sir Seewosagur's fear 
and adopted a resolution condemning France's decision to sell nuclear 
reactors to South Africa. By the 14th OAU Summit31 the list of South 
Africa's nuclear collaborators had grown significantly and the resolution 
on the matter condemned France, West Germany, Israel and the United 
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States for their co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field.32 Con-
demnation gave way to positive proposals at the ISth OAU Summit. The 
Council of Heads of States and Governments adopted Resolution 6 which 
called on "all concerned to end all forms of co-operation with the racist 
regime" and, on the UN Security Council, "to discuss issuing resolutions 
to ban all forms of nuclear co-operation with South Africa... ."33 
Between 1978 and 1983 the issue of South Africa's nuclear program 
had only a residual interest for the OAU attracting no significant discus-
sion until the outgoing Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, raised the mat-
ter in his Valedictory speech to the 20th Summit in Addis Ababa. But 
even at the 20th Summit the discussion of nuclear matters was perfunc-
tory and was not featured in the resolutions adopted at the summit. This 
apparent lapse of interest may be explained by the preoccupation of the 
OAU, in those years, with the more attainable goals of Rhodesian and 
Namibian independence as well as other problems requiring and capable 
of urgent and more realistic solution. Still, the lack of enthusiasm for 
Edem Kodjo's nuclear prescription derives in part from the loss of 
credibility by the author of the proposal34 and from an acute awareness 
of Africa's limitations in such an area of high technology and massive 
financial requirements.35 
Individual African states have consistently expressed concern at the 
dangers inherent in the nuclearization of South Africa. This was evident 
in African reaction to the reported explosion of a low-yield nuclear 
device in the South Atlantic in September 1979. African spokesmen 
uniformly expressed skepticism regarding South Africa's denials and saw 
the explosion as part of South Africa's efforts to build nuclear weapons 
with which she intends to dominate the South African quadrant, 
blackmail other African nations and maintain the apartheid system in-
definitely. There seems, however, to be a general acceptance of the view 
that nuclear weapons do not constitute an attainable or desirable option 
in resolving Africa's colonial problems.36 Thus, there is a noticeable lack 
of investment in nuclear research or nuclear energy programs in nearly 
all member states of the OAU. Only three of the states — Egypt, Libya 
and Nigeria — have a nuclear energy program and, significantly, the 
nuclear energy programs in Egypt and Libya have no prospects of being 
used to create, and put at the disposal of the OAU, a nuclear strike force 
directed against South Africa. If Egypt and Libya were to develop 
nuclear weapons, such weapons would, in all probability, be placed in 
the service of pan-Arabism rather than of pan-Africanism. Consequent-
ly, only the nuclear energy program in Nigeria offers a very remote 
potential for the creation of an African liberation bomb. 
NIGERIA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM 
Nigeria's rudimentary nuclear program was initiated by the military 
regime of Lt-General Obasanjo in 1976. This was a period of 
demonstrable change in Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy. The 
military government led by Murtala Muhammed adopted a messianic 
posture both in domestic and foreign affairs as a corrective to the 
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increasing inept, corrupt and lethargic nature of the Gowon regime 
which it had replaced in a military coup on July 29, 197S. This posture 
was manifested, in domestic affairs, in a comprehensive purge of the 
public services. The purpose of the purge was to create a new ethics of 
public service, and in foreign affairs to achieve a clear articulation of 
Nigeria's interest and foreign policy goals. This change in Nigeria's 
foreign policy posture was dramatized fully in Nigeria's stubborn sup-
port for the MPLA in the Angolan Civil War and the open conflict with 
the Ford Administration over policy options with respect to Angola's in-
dependence. One major catalyst for Nigeria's policy choke regarding 
Angola was South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war, on the 
side of FNLA/UNITA alliance. For General Muhammed, South 
Africa's intervention represented an intolerable attempt to install a client 
state in Angola which could be manipulated to thwart the nationalistic 
aspirations of the people of Namibia and Zimbabwe.37 
The vindication of General Muhammed's policy option relative to 
Angola, by the victory of the Cuban-backed forces of the MPLA, helped 
to sustain the new radicalism in Nigeria's foreign policy behavior even 
after General Muhammed was assassinated in the abortive coup of 
February 1976. Nigeria became increasingly committed to the cause of 
decolonization to the extent that she soon came to be recognized and 
treated as the sixth frontline state in spite of her geographical distance 
from the South African sub-region. It was the logic of this commitment 
which propelled Nigeria to respond in 1976 to the news of France's inten-
tion to sell nuclear reactors to South Africa. Nigeria responded by adop-
ting a policy of nuclear energy development which goal is that of creating 
an African nuclear counterweight to South Africa. Nigerian spokesmen38 
did not hide the fact that this was the ultimate goal of Nigeria's nuclear 
energy research. 
In pursuance of its nuclear ambition, Nigeria established a Nuclear 
Energy Commission in October 1976 to co-ordinate Nigeria's nuclear 
energy research and development efforts while two universities — Ife and 
Ahmadu Bello (Zaria) — were designated special centres39 for promoting 
the teaching, research and development of nuclear sciences. Earlier on 
(in the summer of the same year), a high-powered government delegation 
led by Major-General Yar'Adua had visited West Germany and Canada 
to solicit assistance for Nigeria's desire to purchase nuclear reactors. In 
addition, serious consideration was given to the exploitation of Nigeria's 
uranium resources leading to the establishment of a Nigerian Uranium 
Mining Company which, with technical assistance from Minatome A/ S 
of France, gained monopolistic control of uranium deposits in Nigeria. 
To augment domestic uranium stock, Nigeria has substantial interests 
and investment in uranium mines in the Republic of Niger and the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea. 
However, despite the enthusiasm of the military government and the 
efforts to establish a nuclear energy program, very little has been achiev-
ed in the way of development of the infrastructure of a nuclear industry. 
Nigeria's nuclear program remains within the walls of the two centres at 
Ife and Zaria which have continued to train and retrain the manpower in 
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various aspects of nuclear technology, without any serious probability of 
the skills so taught being put to use. 
The slow pace of the implementation of Nigeria's nuclear aspira-
tions derives from domestic and international constraints. At the 
domestic level, the priorities of the Obasanjo regime shifted very rapidly 
between 1976 and 1979. The initial zeal for foreign policy posturing was 
dissipated by the efforts needed to create the infrastructures of a new 
democratic state and the energies required to manage a tottering 
economy. The task of preparing the way for civilian administration and 
dealing with economic difficulties precipitated by the erratic prices and 
the sale of oil altered the perception of Nigeria's capability and the in-
struments required for attaining policy objectives. Thus, the nuclear pro-
gram receded into the background, joining the mass of programs in the 
low-priority category. 
At the international level, there were no enthusiastic sellers of 
nuclear reactors to Nigeria. The increased vigilance of the United States 
over the sale of reactors to non-nuclear states, particularly after the 
alarm over India's nuclear success, and American readiness to invoke 
sanctions on violators of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would 
have complicated any purchase agreement and circumscribed the transfer 
of nuclear technology and assistance to Nigeria. Even if Nigeria had 
secured a promise of sale it was increasingly clear that, with the problems 
in her economy and the introduction of austerity measures, the military 
government could not, nor was it willing to, justify the investment of the 
huge sums required for the acquisition of nuclear reactors, especially 
since a case for their benefits would have been difficult to make. 
The civil administration which took over power from General 
Obasanjo's regime brought the nuclear debate to the fore partly to im-
prove its grand image of the direction of Nigeria's growth and partly to 
show that the government had a conception of the solution to Nigeria's 
reliable power supply problem. Unlike the predecessor regime, the 
Shagari government emphasized the use of nuclear power to ameliorate 
Nigeria's energy requirements 
The experts point to all the trends leading towards an 
acute shortage of energy around the year 2000 (or 
possibly earlier) ... every effort should be made to meet 
demand with supply through consistent planning and 
rapid execution of energy projects. This anticipated de-
mand can best be obtained from renewable and nuclear 
energy sources.40 
Though Nigeria recognized the efficiency of nuclear energy and its 
desirability in the country's economic development, the investment in the 
nuclear energy program fell infinitely short of that required to begin any 
such program. The Shagari administration has continued to fund the 
research centres at Ife and Zaria but at a grossly inadequate level. In the 
1982-83 fiscal year the Centre at Ife received a grant of 3.3 million naria41 
when it required 4 million naira to purchase a one megawatt research 
reactor, entirely apart from necessary funding for services and personnel 
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emoluments. This situation of underfunding is unlikely to change for a 
long time, given the economic problems in the country and the 
emergence of a policy of reallocating priorities and changing the pattern 
of government spending. With a nearly 40% drop in her oil revenue and 
an overstretched development program, Nigeria is unlikely to be able to 
finance a full-scale nuclear energy program anytime within the next five 
years or even later. The will to invest 400 million dollars on an ex-
perimental research reactor or one billion dollars on a full-scale reactor is 
likely to remain lacking in an atmosphere of limited foreign exchange 
earnings and increasing indebtedness. Hence the prospects of a nuclear-
armed Nigeria is an extremely distant one and the vision of an African 
counterweight to a nuclear-armed South Africa remains very dim. 
THE RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
The redeeming feature of the nuclear option resides in its economic 
advantages. In the first place, it is not generally accepted that nuclear 
reactors will replace oil and other fossil fuels in the not-too-distant future 
as the main source of energy. It is, therefore, not unwise to invest in 
nuclear energy programs. In the case of South Africa, investment in such 
programs is further justified by that country's isolation from the interna-
tional community and her precarious oil supply resulting from the em-
bargo on that product. Nuclear reactors thus offer a great relief from the 
burden of limited and unpredictable oil supplies both in the immediate 
and distant future. Further, not only does the South African economy 
have the capacity to bear the heavy investments required by a nuclear 
program, but such a program promises to be a major source of trade and 
revenue42 because of South Africa's advancement in the production of 
enriched uranium. The same cannot be said for Nigeria. 
The rationality of the nuclear option in Nigeria resides only in terms 
of scientific growth and in the inclination to keep abreast of scientific 
and technological advancements. Nigeria, like other nations, sees a 
future of scarce energy resources which can be forestalled or dealt with 
through a policy of investment in nuclear energy sources. However, the 
future is not as near nor the energy problem as urgent as to demand the 
suicidal investment of scarce Nigerian wealth on an energy source which 
is not immediately required. At the present rate of exploitation Nigeria's 
oil reserves will last another fifty years, even if new reserves are not 
discovered. Her gas and coal reserves are virtually unexploited and 
therefore offer a big cushion against the energy problem which sup-
porters of the nuclear energy program frequently conjure. The invest-
ment in nuclear power will be uneconomic in a context of cheap oil and 
an abundant supply of gas and coal. In any case, Nigeria cannot afford, 
in the near future, the investment required to make nuclear power a 
viable source of alternate energy. 
In talking about the rationality of the nuclear option attention has 
only been centered on nuclear energy and not on nuclear weapons. When 
nuclear weapons are considered, the rationality of the nuclear option 
becomes considerably more difficult if not impossible to discern. There is 
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neither a clear diplomatic nor a military advantage in acquiring nuclear 
weapons by any of the protagonists in the politics of apartheid and 
liberation. 
As far as South Africa is concerned, it has been suggested that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons will enhance its diplomatic status and 
strengthen its bargaining position in relation to the Western powers. As 
Spence points out,43 the dependence of South Africa on capital and 
technology from the West, particularly in respect of her domestic pro-
duction of military hardware and related technology, means she will need 
to continue bargaining with the West and that nuclear weapons may be 
useful in this process. He also argues, however, that it is unlikely that the 
Western powers will shift their positions and attitudes merely in 
deference to South Africa's nuclear status. Neither is it likely, if present 
attitudes remain a valid test, that African states will be persuaded by 
South African nuclear weapons to abandon their commitment to the 
eradication of apartheid or to accept negotiation for anything less than 
this declared objective. 
In the case of an African nuclear power, the nuclear weapon may 
improve status but, paradoxically, it will not improve the diplomatic 
chances of attaining policy objectives in a South Africa which also has 
the leverage of nuclear weapons. In such a context, the threat to use 
nuclear weapons would not be credible, for no African state would risk 
nuclear retaliation and devastation in pursuit of a secondary interest nor 
would it use nuclear weapons against South Africa knowing that would 
destroy the object of liberation. It is for the same reason that the nuclear 
weapon is not a rational military instrument in the nationalistic conflict 
in South Africa. 
South Africa's perception of the threat to its existence is essentially 
landward. The anticipated threat is from guerrilla forces operating from 
bases in African countries on South Africa's borders as well as from ex-
ternally sponsored and sustained domestic insurrection within the black 
African majority. The South African military is, from all indications, 
capable of countering these threats with its program of counter-
insurgency training and comprehensive weapons adaptation. In the 
realm of unconventional warfare, nuclear weapons can have no uses; 
they will not deter guerrilla incursions nor can they be used to destroy 
guerrilla bases without serious repercussions in both the African states 
and South Africa. However, it is also possible to view South Africa's 
nuclear weapons in relation to anticipated threats of Soviet invasion 
from the sea; here tactical nuclear weapons may have a major utility. But 
can the South Africans seriously expect a direct Soviet invasion? Though 
there is an apparent dearth of sophisticated professional strategic 
analysts, there must be a certain awareness of the linkages which exist in 
relationships with the super-powers. Will the Soviet Union risk nuclear 
confrontation with the United States in an area which is not central 
(though of great promise) to her interests, yet which is of interest to the 
United States and other Western powers? The acquisition of nuclear 
weapons cannot be seriously justified by reference to Soviet threats. It 
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would seem that the structure of linkages, which dictates that America 
"barks" in Poland or Afghanistan without "biting" while the Soviet 
Union does the same in Central Ameria, is capable of ensuring that 
Soviet intervention in South Africa will likely remain covert. 
As for an African nuclear power, the constraints outlined above in 
the context of guerrilla warfare will also apply and render the nuclear 
weapon unusable. Beyond this, South Africa is unlikely to allow a 
nuclear power to emerge in Africa. South Africa has already shown its 
preference for Israeli-type preemptive and deterrent strikes into 
neighboring African states. There is no reason to believe that South 
Africa will not further attempt to follow the example of Israel's raid on 
Iraqi nuclear reactors to discourage the emergence of a nuclear power 
and permanent threat to South African security on the African conti-
nent. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it should be obvious that nuclear weapons are 
an irrelevant and wasteful factor in the politics of apartheid and libera-
tion, particularly from the point of view of African states. Rather than 
simplify and hasten the process of liberation, they will inevitably com-
plicate and freeze the process of negotiation and, with that, further en-
trench the status quo within South Africa. 
38 
Conflict Quarterly 
Footnotes 
1. Held in Addis Ababa, June 8-12, 1983. 
2. As enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. 
3. "It is the duty of those who are able to embark resolutely on the nuclear path." 
4. African Research Bulletin, October 1979, p. 5456A. 
5. Held in Addis Ababa, June 1983. 
6. For example, Libya and Nigeria. 
7. African Communist, vol. 85 (2nd Quarter, 1981), p. 13. 
8. African Communist, vol. 85 (2nd Quarter, 1981), p. 14. 
9. D. Worral, "The South African Government's 1977 Constitutional Proposals," p. 
128. 
10. Ibid., p. 128-9. 
11. The National Party lost 3 seats and 11 % of its support (in 1979) with the HNP gaining 
most of this support though it did not win a seat in Parliament. 
12. The Guardian (London), July 6, 1983, p. 8. 
13. Ibid. 
14. The Guardian, July 18, 1983, p. 7. 
15. Ibid. 
16. African Communist, vol. 88 (1982), p. 14-19. 
17. Ibid., p. 15. 
18. Ibid., p. 34. 
19. African Research Bulletin, 1976, p. 4028B. 
20. Prime Minister Vorster announced this discovery by the South African Atomic Energy 
Board in July 1970. 
21. R. Varynen, "South Africa: A Coming Nuclear Power," Instant Research on Peace & 
Violence, vol. 7, no. 1 (1977), p. 47. 
22. African Research Bulletin, August 1-31, 1977, p. 4546A. 
23. African Research Bulletin, October 1-31, 1979, p. 5456A. 
24. Prof. Ivan Smit, a chemistry professor and member of a panel which investigated the 
impact of the Soviet missile in the South Atlantic. 
25. See J.E. Spence, "South Africa: The Nuclear Option," African Affairs, vol. 80, no. 
321 (October 1981). 
26. R. Varynen, "Transnational Corporations in the Military Sector in South Africa," 
Journal of Southern African Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2 (April 1980), p. 243. 
27. J.E. Spence, p. 451. 
28. R.K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Non-Proliferation," Foreign Policy, no. 
26 (Spring 1977), p. 166. 
29. African Research Bulletin, August 1-31, 1977, p. 4546B. 
30. Held in Port Louis, Mauritius, July 2-6, 1976. 
31. Libreville, July 2-5, 1977. 
32. See African Research Bulletin, July 1-31, 1977, p. 4488A. 
33. African Research Bulletin, July 1-31, 1978, p. 4914B. 
34. Resulting from his role in the SADR issue which nearly led to the collapse of the OAU. 
35. Paradoxically the politicians' reticience is not shared by a number of nuclear scientists 
who are normally more sanguine in such matters. For example, nuclear physicists in 
Nigeria often express an enthusiasm for a nuclear program, while in near-bankrupt 
Ghana the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission is known to have called for a 
Third World nuclear bloc to resist the nuclear powers (See Africa Diary, April 8-14, 
1980, p. 9963). 
39 
Fall 1984 
36. The Daily Observer articulates this view very strongly in its editorial entitled Kodjo's 
Farewell Folly republished in the National Concord (Nigeria), July 29, 1983, p. 12. 
37. See General Muhammed's speech to the Extra-ordinary Meeting of OAU's Heads of 
States and Governments, Addis Ababa, January 1976. 
38. Including the number two man in Obasanjo's Government — Major-General Shehu 
Yar'Adua. 
39. Known as the Centre for Energy Research and Development. 
40. From the speech of Mr. A Thomas, Minister of Science & Technology, to the Interna-
tional Energy Conference at Ife, July 1983. 
41. See The Guardian (Lagos), July 26, 1983, back page. 
42. See Financial Times, August 24, 1977. 
43. J.E. Spence, p. 451. 
40 
